MARITAL NAME CHANGE AS A WINDOW INTO GENDER ATTITUDES

LAURA HAMILTON
University of California, Merced
CLAUDIA GEIST
University of Utah
BRIAN POWELL
Indiana University

The need to revise scholars' approach to the measurement of gender attitudes—long dominated by the separate-spheres paradigm—is growing increasingly timely as women's share of the labor force approaches parity with men's. Recent years have seen revived interest in marital name change as a gendered practice with the potential to aid in this task; however, scholars have yet to test its effectiveness as one possible indicator of gender attitudes. In this article we present views toward marital name change as a potential window into contemporary gender attitudes and most centrally as an illustration of the types of measures that hold great potential for attitudinal research. Using quantitative analyses from a national survey, we show that views on name change reflect expected sociodemographic cleavages and are more strongly linked to a wide array of other gender-related attitudes than are views regarding gendered separate spheres—even net of sociodemographic factors. We then turn to interlinked qualitative data to illustrate three reasons why name-change measures so effectively capture broader beliefs about gender. We conclude by looking at what attitudes about name change can tell us about future directions for the conceptualization and measurement of gender attitudes.

Keywords: *family; methods; social psychology; work–family*

During the late 1970s and early 1980s, the gendered nature of language received much attention in the fields of sociology, psychology, communications, and linguistics (Huber 1976; Lakoff 1975; Martyna 1980; Thorne and Henley 1975). The implications of this research have been long lasting: Guidelines for "nonsexist," "gender-neutral," or "gender sensitive" language have been established, are used by many major professional groups, organizations, and publications, and appear regularly in textbooks, job advertisements, and everyday parlance. Despite this widespread movement

GENDER & SOCIETY, Vol. XX No. X, Month XXXX xx-xx
DOI: 10.1177/0891243211398653

toward gender neutrality, one form of gendered language—women's adoption of their husbands' surnames—remains strong in the contemporary United States (Goldin and Shim 2004).

Recent years have seen revived interest in marital name change as a gendered practice. Scholars from an array of fields have noted that it reflects the gendered tension between a woman's own individual interests and those of her family—a choice that Nugent (2010) argues is falsely dichotomized in the United States (also see Forbes et al. 2002; Scheuble and Johnson 1993; Suter 2004). This work, however, often draws on small, nonrepresentative samples, and focuses specifically on the narratives of those struggling with name-change decisions or on perceptions of name changers and keepers. In addition, most research has not explored Americans' general *attitudes* about the longstanding tradition.

In this article we take the next step, looking at Americans' views on name change as one possible indicator of gender attitudes, more broadly conceived. We contend that there is a need to revisit our approach to gender attitude assessment as the presence of women in the workplace—long the primary topic for survey research on gender beliefs—has become commonplace, even expected. We present marital name change as one potential avenue into contemporary gender attitudes, using it primarily to illustrate the types of measures that hold great potential for attitudinal research. Using both quantitative and qualitative data from a national survey, we address these questions:

1. What are Americans' views toward marital name change?
2. How sensitive are name-change beliefs to well-established sociodemographic cleavages in gender attitudes?
3. How effectively are name-change beliefs linked to gender-related social attitudes?
4. How do individuals organize their views about marital name change, and what can this tell us about the assessment of gender attitudes?

Existing Research on Gender Attitudes

Our motivation for this article lies in a careful examination of how gender attitudes are commonly measured in survey research. Since the late 1970s, survey items asking respondents to weigh in on the notion of separate spheres—that is, women as caretakers in the private sphere of the home and men as breadwinners in the public sphere—have been at the center of research on gender attitudes (e.g., Bielby and Bielby 1984; Brooks and Bolzendahl 2004; Mason and Lu 1988; Rice and Coates 1995; Thornton

and Camburn 1979). Driven by the consistent use of these items in national surveys such as the General Social Survey, it is not an exaggeration to say that the vast majority of quantitative scholarship on gender attitudes in the United States has been fundamentally shaped by these survey questions.

However, 30 years have brought considerable change to gender in the United States—both in the workplace and, to a lesser extent, in the home. Propelled by the women's movement and the decline in men's earning power, middle-class married women who opted out of the workforce in the 1950s and early 1960s began a steady return (Padavic and Reskin 2002). In doing so, they started to chip away at the breadwinner–homemaker model that had become the cultural ideal, particularly among white, privileged families (Coontz 1992). Today, roughly 71 percent of women between the ages of 18 and 64 are in the labor force, and women's share of the labor force is quickly approaching parity with men's (Solis and Hall 2009). Currently, only 22 percent of married couples are supported by a male single earner (U.S. Census Bureau 2009).

Efforts to assess gender attitudes in surveys have not, for the most part, kept pace with these changes. Even a few decades ago, researchers cautioned against using the shifting doctrine of separate spheres as a primary indicator of gender attitudes (Huber and Spitze 1981). They noted that gender attitudes can change in response to contemporary and practical concerns (e.g., economic need for women to work outside of the home) but that this change does not necessarily extend to other gender issues.

As a consequence of widespread shifts in views on this issue, attitudinal research based on the notion of separate spheres has also increasingly faced problems of social desirability. Social desirability is the tendency for respondents to answer in ways that they feel will be viewed favorably by others. With women's labor force participation a widely accepted reality, it has become less socially acceptable to publicly denounce working women. Instead of taking such an overtly gender inegalitarian stance, Americans may now be more inclined to express traditional gender views on "subtle" and less controversial issues (Swim and Cohen 1997).

These concerns suggest the importance of developing new ways to assess gender attitudes. As gender and work–family scholars have long argued, we must push "beyond separate spheres" to seek new ways of understanding gender in family life (Ferree 1990). These scholars show that gendered beliefs persist, despite women's representation in the workplace: For example, working women still do the majority of household labor and face a "motherhood penalty" in the workplace (Benard and Correll 2010; Correll, Benard, and Paik 2007). This scholarship reflects a turn away from viewing gender

as a set of roles to a structure maintained by "cultural rules or instructions" for enacting gender—a shift not yet realized in survey research (Ridgeway and Correll 2004, 511).

Marital Name Change as a Window into Gender Attitudes

Sociologists have increasingly recognized the extent to which names provide a window into cultural beliefs and social processes (Lieberson, Dumais, and Baumann 2000). Names are more than just labels; instead, they reflect the ways people organize and classify their social worlds. Ideas about appropriate and desirable naming options can reveal underlying cultural dispositions or "social tastes" toward the gendered, raced, and classed cultural images that names evoke (Lieberson and Bell 1992). Names may thus represent an underutilized way to access unarticulated beliefs about gender.

Marital name change—as an enduring and familiar feature of heterosexual marriage in the United States—holds promise as one avenue into capturing Americans' gender attitudes. This practice originated in notions of the patriarchal family system, in which women were considered property of their husbands (Weitzman 1981). Over time the practice became folded into American law. Until the 1980s, some states denied married women rights (such as the ability to vote) unless they took their husband's name (Goldin and Shim 2004; Penfield 1987). Although name change is no longer legally required, its legacy remains. The incidence of women's name change may have even *increased* in recent years, after a low in the 1970s to 1980s (Goldin and Shim 2004). Women who marry at a younger age, have lower levels of education, are not employed full-time, have less income, do not espouse feminist views, and have lower levels of career commitment are most likely to change their names (Hoffnung 2006; Johnson and Scheuble 1995; Scheuble and Johnson 2005). Currently a majority of married women (around 94 percent of the native born) use their husband's surnames (Gooding and Kreider 2010).

Despite the ubiquity and history of women's name change in the United States, very little research has examined Americans' *attitudes* about name change (for an exception, see Scheuble and Johnson 1993). Two lines of scholarship suggest the potential of doing so. First, scholars analyzing women's narratives about surname choice find that women experience a tension between the needs and interests of the self and those of the family and spouse (Nugent 2010). Name keepers and name changers have different gender worldviews—with the latter being more individualistic and the former placing their familial relationships first (Foss and Edson 1989; Suter 2004). The second line of research concerns perceptions of women's naming choices. Researchers,

primarily in psychology, have shown that people view women who keep their names as more competent, intelligent, and individually oriented and women who change their names as more dependent, caring, and communal (Forbes et al. 2002). Taken together, this work suggests that name change elicits strong and patterned beliefs about how gender should be enacted.

In this article we systematically examine the ability of beliefs regarding marital name change to reflect gender attitudes more generally. We show that views on name change map onto expected sociodemographic cleavages—a key marker of a functioning attitudinal measure. We then demonstrate that name-change attitudes are more strongly linked to other gender-related social attitudes than are standard separate-spheres items, even net of sociodemographic factors. Finally, we use qualitative data to illustrate three core reasons why name-change measures are so effective. As we elaborate in the conclusion, our goal is not to suggest that name-change measures offer the single most effective approach in capturing gender attitudes but rather to use them as an *example* of the type of items that have unique potential for future survey research.

DATA, MEASURES, AND METHOD

Data

Data for this study come from the 2006 Constructing the Family Survey (CFS). This telephone survey of a random sample of Indiana ($n = 331$) and continental U.S. ($n = 484$) adult residents was conducted by the Center for Survey Research at Indiana University. The purpose of the survey was to gauge public opinion regarding a wide range of gender- and family-related topics, including name change upon marriage, work–family attitudes, feminist self-identity, religious and political views, fertility decisions, attitudes about sexual relations, definitions of family, and attitudes toward same-sex marriage and adoption. Information on sociodemographic characteristics was also collected. A distinctive feature of these data is their inclusion of open-ended questions—a rarity in large-scale surveys—allowing respondents to contextualize and explain their responses in greater detail. Below we describe both the quantitative and qualitative data as well as our mixed-methods approach.

Quantitative Measures

Name-change attitudes. We use our quantitative data to evaluate how well attitudinal measures reflect expected sociodemographic cleavages and

predict a wide array of other gender-related beliefs. We construct a standardized scale based on three close-ended items that tap into individuals' beliefs about name-change practices associated with heterosexual marriage (see Table 1). *Better to change* asks whether or not it is generally better for a woman to change her last name to her husband's upon marriage. It is designed to provide an overall evaluation of the practice. *Legally required* asks whether or not states should legally require a woman to change her name to her husband's last name. It has a more stringent threshold for agreement, as it also evokes beliefs about state intervention in private life. The final item (*male name change*), which asks whether or not it is "okay" for a man to take his wife's name, elicits gender beliefs about men's practices.

Separate-spheres attitudes. To determine the analytical utility of views toward name change, we include measures of *separate-spheres attitudes* as a comparison. These items reference separate-spheres ideology—or the notion that women belong in the private sphere, men in the public—and ask respondents to assess the appropriateness and consequences of traditional arrangements as well as less traditional ones (e.g., women in the workplace). In our examination of the literature, we found that these measures—often alone, other times in tandem with items about women in politics—are more frequently used than any other set of survey measures to capture gender attitudes, gender-role attitudes, attitudes toward women's roles, sex-role attitudes, and gender ideology (e.g., Ciabattari 2001; Mason and Lu 1988; Moore and Vanneman 2003; Rice and Coates 1995; Thornton and Camburn 1979).

The CFS data include three of the most widely used separate-spheres items, which we combine into a standardized scale. As seen in Table 1, *husband breadwinner* asks whether or not it is much better for everyone involved if the man is the achiever outside of the home and the woman takes care of the home and family. It provides an overall assessment of the separate-spheres approach and is perhaps the single most commonly used item—appearing in repeated waves of the General Social Survey (GSS), the National Survey of Families and Households, the National Survey of Family Growth (NSFG), and the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. *Working mother* asks whether or not a working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work and is included in the GSS and NSFG. Finally, *husband career* asks whether or not it is more important for a wife to help her husband's career than to have one herself and also appears in the GSS. We use these items solely as a counterpoint in evaluating the utility of name-change measures.

TABLE 1: Name-Change and Separate-Spheres Attitude Scales, 2006 Constructing the Family Survey

Variable	*Question Wording*	*Metric*	*M*	*SD*
Name-change scale (α = .77)			7.07	2.64
Better to change	It is generally better if a woman changes her last name to her husband's name when she marries.	*Strongly agree* = 1 to *strongly disagree* = 4	2.06	0.99
Legally required	In the past, some states legally required a woman to change her name to her husband's name. Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree that this was a good idea?	*Strongly agree* = 1 to *strongly disagree* = 4	2.57	1.13
Male name change	It's okay for a man to take his wife's name when he marries.[a]	*Strongly disagree* = 1 to *strongly agree* = 4	2.44	1.13
Separate-spheres scale (α = .70)			9.60	2.34
Husband breadwinner	It is much better for everyone involved if the man is the achiever outside of the home and the woman takes care of the home and family.	*Strongly agree* = 1 to *strongly disagree* = 4	2.85	1.12
Working mother	A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work.[a]	*Strongly disagree* = 1 to *strongly agree* = 4	3.27	0.90
Husband career	It is more important for a wife to help her husband's career than to have one herself.	*Strongly agree* = 1 to *strongly disagree* = 4	3.21	0.97

NOTE: *N* = 714.
a. These items are reverse coded.

Sociodemographic factors. We also include a number of sociodemographic factors: sex, age, race, education, marital status, number of children, employment status, urbanicity, and region of residence. Our goal is to determine

TABLE 2: Sociodemographic Factors

Variable	*Metric*	*M*	*SD*
Female	0–1	0.54	0.50
Age (in years)	18–88	45.44	16.72
Race			
White	0–1	0.80	0.40
Black	0–1	0.08	0.27
Non-white/non-Black	0–1	0.12	0.33
Education			
< high school degree	0–1	0.06	0.24
High school degree	0–1	0.24	0.43
Some college	0–1	0.32	0.47
College	0–1	0.23	0.42
Advanced degree	0–1	0.15	0.36
Married	0–1	0.59	0.49
Number of children	0–12	1.97	1.74
Employed	0–1	0.72	0.45
Urbanicity			
Urban	0–1	0.47	0.50
Suburban	0–1	0.25	0.43
Rural	0–1	0.28	0.45
Region			
Northeast	0–1	0.11	0.31
North Central	0–1	0.56	0.50
West	0–1	0.11	0.31
South	0–1	0.23	0.42

(1) the extent to which views on name change capture well-known sociodemographic cleavages and (2) how well name-change attitudes fare in comparison with separate-spheres attitudes, even net of these factors. Table 2 provides a more detailed description of these measures and summary statistics for the sample. Descriptive statistics presented here are weighted by gender and age to produce a nationally representative sample, similar to the GSS 2004 sample population.

Gender and other social attitudes. An additional goal is to examine the extent to which views on name change link to other contested gender and social attitudes, taking into account sociodemographic factors as controls. Once again, we use the separate-spheres items as a point of comparison. We focus on 12 measures that cover six topics—feminist self-identification, fertility decisions, religious and political views, beliefs about sexual relations, definitions of family, and support for gay and lesbian rights (see Table 3).

TABLE 3: Additional Social Attitudes

Variable	*Question Wording*	*Metric*	*M*	*SD*
Feminist identity				
Feminist self-identification	Do you think of yourself as a feminist or not?	*No* = 0, *yes* = 1	0.28	0.45
Politics and religion				
Political self-identification	How would you classify your political views? Please use a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is extremely liberal, 4 is middle of the road, and 7 is extremely conservative.[a]	*Extremely conservative* = 1 to *extremely liberal* = 7	3.68	1.50
Biblical inerrancy	Which statement comes closest to describing your feelings about the Bible? A: The Bible is the actual word of God and it is to be taken literally, word for word. B: The Bible is the inspired word of God but not everything should be taken literally, word for word. C: The Bible is an ancient book of fables, legends, history, and moral teachings recorded by man.	*Literal word* = 1, *inspired word* = 2, *book of fables* = 3	1.84	0.65
Fertility decisions				
Woman refuse	If the husband in a family wants children, but the wife does not, is it all right for the wife to refuse to have children?	*No* = 0, *yes* = 1	0.84	0.37
Man refuse	If the wife in a family wants children, but the husband does not, is it all right for the husband to refuse to have children?	*No* = 0, *yes* = 1	0.81	0.39
Sexuality				
Unmarried relations	What about sexual relations between an unmarried woman and an unmarried man? Do you think it is: always wrong, almost always wrong, wrong only sometimes, not wrong at all?	*Always wrong* = 1 to *not wrong at all* = 4	2.69	1.24

(continued)

TABLE 3: (continued)

Variable	*Question Wording*	*Metric*	*M*	*SD*
Same-sex relations	What about sexual relations between two adults of the same sex?	*Always wrong* = 1 to *not wrong at all* = 4	2.27	1.35
Family definitions				
Unmarried couple	Are a man and a woman living together as an unmarried couple a family?	*No* = 0, *yes* = 1	0.38	0.49
Gay couple	What about two men living together as a couple who have no children?	*No* = 0, *yes* = 1	0.30	0.46
Lesbian couple	What about two women living together as a couple who have no children?	*No* = 0, *yes* = 1	0.30	0.46
Gay and lesbian rights				
Same-sex marriage	Gay and lesbian couples should be allowed to marry.[a]	*Strongly disagree* = 1 to *strongly agree* = 4	2.19	1.23
Same-sex adoption	Gay or lesbian couples who have been living in a long-term stable relationship should be allowed to adopt children.[a]	*Strongly disagree* = 1 to *strongly agree* = 4	2.47	1.22

a. These items are reverse coded.

When possible, the phrasing of social attitude questions is identical or similar to measures included in the GSS.

Each of these topics has been identified by past literature as related to, or reflective of, gender attitudes, although the casual direction for some items is not entirely clear. Feminist self-identification, for example, is often conceptualized as an ideological orientation toward "feminist" (or nontraditional) gender attitudes (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004; Plutzer 1988). Recently, however, sociologists have been frustrated by the relatively weak link between feminist identification and measures of gender attitudes—including views regarding work and family (Schnittker, Freese, and Powell 2003). Political identification is generally understood to be closely aligned with views regarding gender, as those who hold more liberal gender attitudes are more likely to identify as politically liberal (Mason and Lu 1988; McCabe 2005). Items regarding fertility decisions access notions about individuals' control over their own body and the reproductive rights of women and men—issues that have figured centrally in the U.S. abortion debates (Luker 1984). Past research has also indicated that religious fundamentalism, or a belief in the inerrancy of the Bible, is related to inegalitarian gender attitudes (Moore and Vanneman 2003).

Questions regarding sexuality and family are also included as both are key arenas in which women and men enact gender. For example, individuals are marked as masculine or feminine in part by indicating interest in the opposite sex (Butler 1990). Consequently, research has associated inegalitarian gender attitudes with negative views toward homosexuality (Whitley 2001). Similarly, family is a deeply gendered institution, often legally and socially premised on the notion of a heterosexual, married couple, where men and women traditionally meet different behavioral expectations (e.g., women taking on a disproportionate share of household labor). Thus, views about what forms of sexuality are appropriate and who "counts" as family are intricately linked to individuals' gender beliefs (Powell et al. 2010).

Qualitative Measures

We include qualitative data to understand why we observe particular quantitative patterns—a task to which they are well suited. The CFS is unique in that it provides the opportunity to conduct this type of analysis. After asking respondents whether they *strongly agreed*, *somewhat agreed*, *somewhat disagreed*, or *strongly disagreed* with the item "It is generally better if a woman changes her last name to her husband's name when she marries" (*better to change*), approximately one-third of the respondents were randomly

selected to explain their responses (n = 237). Those who agreed with the statement were asked, "Why do you think it's better for a woman to change her name?" Those who disagreed were asked, "Why don't you think it's better for a woman to change her name?"

An additional one-third of respondents (n = 243)—also randomly selected—were asked to identify the circumstances under which they would be willing to bend their beliefs. In this article, we focus on the responses of those who agreed with the *better to change* item. They were asked, "Under what circumstances would it would it be better for a woman to keep her own name?" A team of undergraduate research assistants transcribed responses to the open-ended questions, which the authors then organized and coded in ATLAS.ti, a qualitative data analysis program.

Analytical Strategy

The central goal of our analyses is to evaluate views toward name change as indicators of gender attitudes and to develop a better understanding of how name-change measures operate. We proceed in three steps. We first examine response patterns to the name-change items and determine the extent to which sociodemographic factors predict name-change attitudes by estimating ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. Then, we present bivariate correlations as well as the Bayesian information criterion, or BIC statistic—a measure of model fit for OLS, logistic, and multinomial logistic regressions (where appropriate). The BIC statistic helps us to determine how well views regarding name change correspond to other gender-related social issues. To assess the relative utility of name-change attitudes, we use separate-spheres attitudes as a counterpoint in both the first and second steps. In a final step we use the qualitative data to glean insight into why name-change measures operate so effectively, identifying three central themes underlying individuals' responses.

RESULTS

Scale Response Patterns and Sociodemographic Predictors

Table 1 and Figure 1 illustrate the means and distributions of name-change items, respectively.[1] Overall, name-change attitudes are fairly traditional. Figure 1 indicates that nearly three-fourths of respondents (72.3 percent) agree that it is generally better if a woman changes her last name to her husband's name when she marries. In fact, approximately one-third of the



Figure 1: Distribution for Name-Change Scale Items

respondents (33.7 percent) give the most conservative response, strongly agreeing with this statement. It is perhaps even more striking that approximately half of the respondents (49.9 percent) agree that it was a good idea for states to legally require a woman to change her name; in fact, nearly a quarter (22.3 percent) strongly agree with a legal requirement. Similarly, nearly half (46.5 percent) disagree that is "okay" for a man to take his wife's name when he marries, with around one-third (30.6 percent) providing the most conservative response of *strongly disagree*.[2]

In contrast, separate-spheres items tend to evoke a highly skewed liberal response. Two-thirds of respondents (67.1 percent) disagree that it is much better for everyone involved if the man is the achiever outside of the home and the woman takes care of the home and the family, over four-fifths (81.7 percent) agree that a working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work, and four-fifths (80.0 percent) disagree that it is more important for a wife to help her husband's career than to have one herself. Given that gender attitudes tend to (although not always) move toward egalitarianism, these distributions suggest that views toward name change may be less likely to experience a "ceiling effect," in which it becomes increasingly difficult to identify meaningful differences among respondents.

One mark of a good indicator of gender attitudes is its ability to differentiate among respondents who by virtue of their sociodemographic statuses should—according to both theory and prior research—have significantly different views (McHugh and Frieze 1997). Thus, we investigate the extent

to which name-change measures are sensitive to these expected cleavages. Table 4 presents the results of the regression analysis in which the influence of sociodemographic factors on name-change attitudes is estimated. Model 1 includes gender, age, race, and education. Model 2 incorporates three core statuses: marital status, number of children, and employment status. Finally, model 3 also takes into account the influence of place, more specifically, urbanicity and region. As these models indicate, all but one of these sociodemographic factors are significantly linked to views on name change.

Importantly, however, these results also suggest that name-change attitudes may more efficiently capture some sociodemographic cleavages than do separate-spheres attitudes. For example, in model 1 the sex difference is significant for the name-change scale ($b = 0.659$, $p < .01$), indicating that women are more likely to be critical of traditional naming practices, but only marginally so for the separate-spheres scale ($b = 0.320$, $p < .10$). This is particularly notable as a significant sex difference has been identified as a key indicator of validity when measuring gender attitudes (McHugh and Frieze 1997). In addition, the ostensibly liberalizing effects of education are stronger for the name-change scale. This pattern holds across the board, from lower levels of education (i.e., with significant differences between those with and without a high school degree) to higher levels (i.e., with significant differences between those with a college degree and those with an advanced degree). In contrast, the effect of education on separate-spheres attitudes is more restricted, with no significant differences at upper or lower levels of education. In other words, views regarding name change are more sensitive to slight educational differences. Age effects, however, appear to be similar across both scales, with older individuals holding more conservative views toward name change ($b = –0.035$, $p < .01$) and separate-spheres issues ($b = –0.037$, $p < .01$).

Prior literature suggests that race should shape gender attitudes, but perhaps in divergent ways. For example, we might expect African Americans to hold more liberal views regarding separate spheres, given Black women's historically high levels of labor force participation. However, as white women's rates of labor force participation approach those of Black women, gender attitudes among racial groups are converging (Carter, Corra, and Carter 2009). In contrast, African Americans hold more traditional views on gender-related issues such as homosexuality and premarital sex (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004).

These data suggest that the name-change scale is more sensitive to racial differences in gender attitudes. In model 1, we see that there are significant racial differences in views toward name change, with Blacks holding more traditional views than whites ($b = –1.217$, $p < .01$). However, the separate-spheres scale shows minimal differences among Blacks,

TABLE 4: Regression Coefficients for Name-Change and Separate-Spheres Attitudes on Sociodemographic Characteristics

	Model 1		*Model 2*		*Model 3*	
	Name-Change Scale	*Separate-Spheres Scale*	*Name-Change Scale*	*Separate-Spheres Scale*	*Name-Change Scale*	*Separate-Spheres Scale*
Female	0.659**	0.320†	0.703**	0.370*	0.658**	0.375*
	(0.176)	(0.171)	(0.175)	(0.172)	(0.174)	(0.173)
Age	–0.035**	–0.037**	–0.024**	–0.028**	–0.024**	–0.028**
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Black	–1.217**	0.110	–1.247**	0.086	–1.242**	0.034
	(0.330)	(0.322)	(0.328)	(0.322)	(0.330)	(0.327)
Other race	0.033	–0.220	–0.017	–0.244	–0.118	–0.334
	(0.267)	(0.261)	(0.265)	(0.260)	(0.268)	(0.266)
High school degree	0.760*	0.433	0.697†	0.358	0.651†	0.377
	(0.376)	(0.366)	(0.375)	(0.368)	(0.371)	(0.368)
Some college	1.147**	1.002**	1.060**	0.890*	0.932*	0.887*
	(0.369)	(0.360)	(0.370)	(0.363)	(0.369)	(0.365)
College	1.996**	1.538**	1.874**	1.385**	1.763**	1.360**
	(0.381)	(0.371)	(0.388)	(0.380)	(0.387)	(0.383)
Advanced degree	2.866**	1.616**	2.705**	1.436**	2.548**	1.352**
	(0.396)	(0.386)	(0.404)	(0.396)	(0.402)	(0.398)
Married			–0.403*	–0.235	–0.399*	–0.231
			(0.179)	(0.176)	(0.178)	(0.176)
Number of children			–0.147**	–0.052	–0.140**	–0.040
			(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.052)
Employed			0.361†	0.585**	0.381†	0.580**
			(0.207)	(0.203)	(0.205)	(0.203)
Suburban					–0.286	–0.131
					(0.206)	(0.204)
Rural					–0.528*	–0.219
					(0.205)	(0.203)
Northeast					0.805*	0.503
					(0.317)	(0.314)
North Central					0.562**	–0.119
					(0.207)	(0.205)
West					1.008**	0.012
					(0.316)	(0.313)
Constant	–0.122	0.624	–0.244	0.113	–0.440	0.259
R^2	.18	.13	.21	.14	.23	.15

NOTE: $N = 714$. Standard errors in parentheses. Omitted categories are less than high school degree, urban, and South.
†$p < .10$. *$p < .05$. **$p < .01$.

whites, and those with other racial classifications—a finding that is consistent with recent analyses of separate-spheres items based on GSS data (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004).

Model 2 demonstrates that views on name change also may be more attuned to parental and marital status. Being married and having more children are significantly linked to views toward name change ($b = -0.403$, $p < .05$ and $b = -0.147$, $p < .01$, respectively)—patterns that remain in model 3. These items, however, do not reach significance for separate-spheres attitudes; others—some of whom have examined the GSS—have similarly noted that such family-status factors are, perplexingly, only weakly or moderately associated with separate-spheres issues (Mason and Lu 1988; Plutzer 1988).

Moreover, as model 3 indicates, urbanicity and region significantly predict name change but not separate-spheres attitudes. Respondents from rural areas report more traditional views on marital name change than those from urban areas ($b = -0.528$, $p < .05$). Whereas others have noted limited regional effects for other measures of gender attitudes (Rice and Coates 1995), these differences are striking for the name-change scale—with respondents from the West ($b = 1.008$, $p < .01$) and Northeast ($b = 0.805$, $p < .05$) being most liberal, the South the most conservative (reference category), and the North Central region moderate ($b = 0.562$, $p < .01$).

Employment is the only sociodemographic factor that may be less effectively linked to the name-change scale. Name-change attitudes are only weakly related to employment ($b = 0.361$, $p < .10$, model 2; $b = 0.381$, $p < .10$, model 3), while separate-spheres attitudes—which explicitly reference views on working women—are significantly associated with employment ($b = 0.585$, $p < .01$, model 2; $b = 0.580$, $p < .01$, model 3).

In sum, attitudes toward name change show a significant sex difference, greater sensitivity to levels of education, a distinct racial pattern, and effects for marital status, parental status, urbanicity, and region that are not apparent with separate-spheres attitudes. Notably, across all models and most distinctly in model 3, the overall model fit (based on the R^2 statistic) is greater for the name-change scale than for the separate-spheres scale (.23 and .15, respectively). These differences suggest that the groupings of sociodemographic factors presented here—factors assumed to be highly predictive of gender attitudes—more effectively explain variance in attitudes toward name change. Thus, in these data name-change attitudes are more closely related to key sociodemographic factors than are separate-spheres attitudes.[3]

Name Change, Gender Attitudes, and Other Social Attitudes

In this section we examine whether, and if so how strongly, views regarding name change are linked to gender attitudes as well as other social attitudes related to gender. We examine 12 attitudinal items that cover a wide array of

TABLE 5: Bivariate Correlations for Social Attitudes and Gender-Ideology Scales

	Bivariate Correlations	
Variables	*Name-Change Scale*	*Separate-Spheres Scale*
Feminist identity		
Feminist self-identification	.279	.187
Politics and religion		
Political self-identification	.310	.234
Biblical inerrancy	.388	.293
Fertility decisions		
Wife refuse	.226	.210
Husband refuse	.254	.219
Sexuality		
Unmarried relations	.387	.373
Same-sex relations	.515	.382
Family definitions		
Unmarried couple	.259	.237
Gay couple	.408	.298
Lesbian couple	.414	.299
Gay and lesbian rights		
Same-sex marriage	.555	.406
Same-sex adoption	.526	.420

NOTE: All correlations are statistically significant ($p < .001$).

topics—including feminist identity, political leaning, religious beliefs, fertility decisions, sexuality, family definitions, and beliefs about homosexuality—that have been identified by past research as associated with gender (Butler 1990; Lorber 1994; McCabe 2005; Moore and Vanneman 2003; Schnittker, Freese, and Powell 2003; Whitley 2001). Our intention is not to demonstrate causality, as these are likely complex cases of mutual reinforcement, but to test the strength of the ties between attitudes toward name change and other critical gender issues. We return to the commonly used separate-spheres scale to provide a basis of comparison and lend confidence to our assessment of name-change items.

We start with basic bivariate correlations between each of the scales and the 12 social attitudes (displayed in Table 5). All correlations are significant, and as scores on both scales move toward more liberal responses, so do responses for all of the other attitudes. Notably, in every case the magnitude of the correlation is greater for the name-change scale than for the separate-spheres scale, suggesting stronger links to the full array of gender-related

attitudes. Bivariate correlations, however, present only a limited picture of the relationship between the scales and gender-linked social attitudes: They are not sensitive to the characteristics of noninterval data and fail to account for the effects of control variables.

Thus, in a second step, we compare bivariate and multivariate analyses (using OLS, logistic, and multinomial logistic regression where appropriate) in which name-change and separate-spheres scales are included separately as predictors of the 12 gender-linked issues. The BIC statistic, which is becoming increasingly popular in sociological research, is used to determine if the model including the name-change scale or the separate-spheres scale provides a better "fit"—that is, which does a better job of accurately predicting individuals' gender attitudes. BIC statistics are ideal as they are applicable regardless of the type of data (e.g., categorical, interval) and produce *grades* of evidence, indicating how strong the statistical preference is for one model over another (where the model that produces the smaller BIC is preferred). Grades of evidence are determined by the difference between the BIC scores: 0–2 points indicates "weak" evidence in favor of one model over the other, 2–6 points indicates "positive" evidence, 6–10 points indicates "strong" evidence, and more than 10 points indicates "very strong" evidence (Raftery 1995). Table 6 presents these results.

Starting with feminist identification, at the bivariate level the BIC statistic indicates that compared to the separate-spheres model, the name-change model is the better fitting model and that the evidence of this difference is *very strong*—the highest level of evidence. We highlight this item because, as we noted earlier, scholars have been perplexed by weak ties between feminist self-identification and other measures of gender attitudes. Finding a measure with a stronger link to feminist identity is an important step toward better capturing gender attitudes. The analytical power of views regarding name change, however, extends beyond feminist self-identification. In fact, at the bivariate level, the BIC specifies preference for the name-change model across *all* other gender-related attitudes.

As we have demonstrated, attitudes toward name change are more closely associated with most sociodemographic factors than are separate-spheres attitudes. This could mean that the BIC statistic's support for name-change models at the bivariate level is simply a function of the extent to which views regarding name change capture sociodemographic factors. To test this proposition, we include the factors discussed earlier, but this time as controls—allowing us to more effectively disentangle the effects of both indicators.

With regard to feminist identification—even with the addition of sociodemographic factors—the BIC statistic still indicates a very strong preference

TABLE 6: Fit Statistics for Regressions of Social Attitudes on Gender-Ideology Scales

	Bayesian Information Criterion Preferred Model and Grade of Evidence	
Variables	*No Control*	*With Control*
Feminist identity		
Feminist self-identification	NC very strong	NC very strong
Politics and religion		
Political self-identification	NC very strong	NC very strong
Biblical inerrancy	NC very strong	NC very strong
Fertility decisions		
Wife refuse	NC strong	NC positive
Husband refuse	NC very strong	NC strong
Sexuality		
Unmarried relations	NC strong	NC strong
Same-sex relations	NC very strong	NC very strong
Family definitions		
Unmarried couple	NC positive	NC very strong
Gay couple	NC very strong	NC very strong
Lesbian couple	NC very strong	NC very strong
Gay and lesbian rights		
Same-sex marriage	NC very strong	NC very strong
Same-sex adoption	NC very strong	NC very strong

NOTE: NC = name-change scale preferred over separate-spheres scale. Grade of evidence from lowest level to highest: weak, positive, strong, very strong (Raftery 1995).

for the model including name change attitudes. In fact, the BIC supports the model with name-change attitudes over the model with separate-spheres attitudes in predicting all gender-related attitudes. There are no cases of weak support—the lowest level of evidence—and for nine out of 12 social attitudes the BIC specifies a very strong preference for the model including name-change attitudes. That the name-change scale shows such a consistent and robust relationship to a large range of gender-related issues, regardless of sociodemographic factors, suggests that this measure—even by itself—is a powerful indicator of gender attitudes.[4]

Identifying Effective Features of Name-Change Measures

In this section we use our qualitative, open-ended response data to explore *why* name-change items perform so well as indicators of gender attitudes. Without comparable qualitative data on separate-spheres items, we do not make explicit comparisons between the two scales but rather seek to identify

the underlying themes around which respondents organize their views on marital name change and, as we have shown, gender. We first turn to central divides in attitudes and show how the tension between collectivist and individualist orientations, as identified in prior work, effectively differentiates those with more traditional versus more liberal beliefs. Next, we highlight the centrality of identity to the full range of responses and note the importance of measures that capture this symbolic component of the self. Finally, we discuss the value in unlinking attitudinal measures from gender role occupancy and opening space for more salience-based interpretations.

The collectivist–individualist divide. Much previous research on marital name change—and general gender scholarship—has recognized the ongoing tension between commitments to family and self that women experience in ways that men often do not (Bielby and Bielby 1984; Foss and Edson 1989; Nugent 2010). However, little work has explored the extent to which an individual's affinity for a collectivist gender orientation—emphasizing the needs of family, children, and society—or an individualist gender orientation—prioritizing the self—serves as a litmus test in determining their broader gender views.

For example, one common way respondents explained *why* it was *better* for women to change their names was to identify collectivist sources that dictate the practice—namely, religion, tradition, and/or society. Some of the most vocal name-change advocates turned to the Bible (although name change became practice well after the biblical era). Their responses suggest that women must follow religiously proscribed gender practices—despite their own feelings on the issue. One respondent noted,

> Woman was made out of man, and therefore man is the head of the house. I know the feminine isn't gonna like that, but that's the way the biblical standard is. That doesn't mean the woman is a slave to anybody or anything else, but it does mean just what it says, that the man is the head of the house.

Others highlighted the importance of adhering to tradition and the "mores and folkways of our society"—as one respondent put it. Another similarly indicated, "I guess it's just been the common practice for so long—the common thing to do. It's the way we did it. That's the way I think it should be done." A third group focused more on pragmatic concerns—the smooth running of day-to-day interactions and even society. As one respondent joked, women's name change "keeps the mailman from getting confused." All three types of responses reflect the need to turn *outside of the individual* for guidance on how to appropriately enact gender.

When those who were critical of name change were asked *why* it was *not better* for women to change their names, the focus was unerringly on individual choice. As one noted, "I think it should be choice, not law." They generally saw name change as a private issue, not a public issue of right or wrong. As another stated, "I think they should have their own opinion on it, and if they want to change their name, then more power to 'em, but if not, you know, more power to 'em there, too." Some of these respondents also cited pragmatic concerns. In contrast to those with more traditional views, as discussed above, they suggested that by keeping their names women could choose to make things easier for *themselves*. One explained,

> It's difficult. . . . If you have certain things in place already, like a mortgage and stuff, and then you change your name, it takes a long time to do everything. . . . It's just a lot of stuff to do it. . . . People don't know you [don't] have the same name anymore. They don't recognize your name and that person you were before.

These responses, thus, focused on *individuals* as arbiters of how people should enact gender.

As Table 7—reflecting the entirety of responses—suggests, name-change attitudes cleanly map into an important tension: Those with traditional views on name change are more collectivist, while those with liberal views are more individualist. Indeed, few people give responses that evoke both orientations, and cross-cutting argumentation (e.g., those with traditional name-change views applying individualist orientations) is virtually absent. Importantly, this is not for lack of possibility. It is possible to make a conservative gender argument using an individualist logic—for instance, by suggesting that individual women personally benefit from traditional gender relations. Similarly, one could make a liberal gender argument using a collectivist logic—such as by rejecting traditional practices as part of a movement for social change. Given the power with which name-change items predict other gender-related attitudes, we see this as an important insight into how gender beliefs, more broadly defined, are organized—an issue to which we return in the conclusion.[5]

The centrality of identity. Citing the words of early women's activist Lucy Stone, "My name is the symbol of my identity," scholars posit that name change is fundamentally a symbolic question of gendered identity (Foss and Edson 1989; Penfield 1987, 125). In this sense, views about name change may tap into a shifting current in how people think about gender. For instance, scholars increasingly view gender as performance, or an

TABLE 7: Attitudes toward Name Change, by Collectivist and Individualist Gender Orientations

Better to Change	*Collectivist (%)*	*Individualist (%)*	*Both (%)*
Strongly agree	49	2	27
Somewhat agree	47	8	53
Somewhat disagree	4	53	13
Strongly disagree	1	38	7
Total *N* (of respondents)	158	64	15

enactment of cultural understandings about how women, as opposed to men, are supposed to represent themselves (West and Zimmerman 1987). Others similarly suggest that gender—along with other social identities—has moved into the symbolic realm and now works primarily as a signal of who we are and who we feel others should be (Giddens 1991). To date, however, few efforts have been made to capture identity-based conceptions of gender in survey research.

Our results indicate the importance of items that provide respondents with the flexibility to offer an identity-based response. For example, when asked why it was better or why it was not better for women to change their names, over half of our sample (54 percent) gave explanations premised around the notion of gender as identity—suggesting a high level of compatibility with this contemporary understanding of gender. This type of response was used more frequently by women, Black respondents, and the better educated. Notably, identity-based explanations maintained the same collectivist–individualist split illustrated above.

Those who supported the traditional practice, for example, highlighted a marital or familial identity in which women subsume their individual identities into those of the spouse or family group. Thus, as one noted, "I know right now everyone likes their own identity but I believe in the old philosophy of a woman taking her husband's name. . . . Cause once you marry you're part of this man." Similarly, as another respondent explained, women should change their names "so that there's a connection there. Just a connection to let you know that she belongs to him." Others contended that it was a woman's job to create a family identity, by leaving her old name behind. As one individual indicated, women's name change is important "for identification with the man . . . with the family. It's better for the children if the family all have the same name." Another stated, "In written form [name change] is their bond of union. That they share the same name and they share the same family."

In contrast, some of those with more liberal views explicitly opposed the name-change practice on the grounds that it is detrimental to women's own independent identities. One noted,

> When a woman changes her name, she loses her identity. . . . A lot of the times in the past when a woman got married, she lost her rights as a single person to make her own decisions. So I never agreed with that. . . . I didn't like that.

Some equated identity loss with losing ownership over the self. As one vividly put it,

> It's unnecessary. How's that? What's the point of that? It's a matter of possession. Do you like to be possessed? I mean, it's almost like ownership, isn't it? That's my feelings of it. Hey, and I'm an old guy. I've never understood that.

Others focused specifically on individual identities that they felt name change would challenge:

> I'm a clinical psychologist. . . . I would never drop my name; I would simply add on or hyphen a name. I think I've been whoever I've been for this long amount of time. I can't see that I'm suddenly going to become something else. I don't mind adding something to my life, but I don't think I should have to subtract.

A few similarly indicated that women's identities outside of marriage and family were as important as those of men, noting that "some people have a career and have other interests and they believe their name has just as much value as her husband's."

Moving beyond roles. There has long been a push in gender theory to move past conceptualizing gender as a set of distinct "sex roles," as is central to the separate-spheres approach (Ferree 1990; Risman 2004). Gender is manifest differently over time and is contingent on historical, economic, cultural, political, and geographic circumstances; this is in part what makes gender so robust. Thus, linking gender to any specific set of roles—such as breadwinner versus homemaker—or contexts—like the public sphere of the workplace or the private sphere of the home—may be problematic, especially for surveys gauging attitudinal change over time.

One tactic in survey research may be to avoid explicitly referencing roles or role-linked contexts. This may motivate respondents to set aside issues

of role occupancy (e.g., which roles women should and should not hold) for questions of *salience*. The concept of salience taps into what set of cultural rules or instructions for gender respondents see as most important—for example, what type of gendered identities should women and men prioritize and who or what should have the most say (e.g., tradition, religion, society, or the self) when it comes to how gender should be enacted. This approach allows respondents to depart from supporting traditional gender roles while still holding traditional gender beliefs. For instance, a respondent could support women in the workplace—perhaps for their economic contributions to family—but believe that women's familial identities should be most salient. This distinction would be less visible when using a question that is more heavily role oriented.

Here we show the importance of unlinking survey items from gender roles by illustrating what happens when otherwise gender-conservative participants place their responses in the context of traditional gender roles. These respondents, who agreed that it was better for women to change their names after marriage, were asked if there were any *circumstances* under which it is better for women *not* to change their names. The most common response, offered even more frequently than an outright refusal to answer the question, was to interpret circumstances as *role based*—more specifically, as a departure from traditional gender roles. In fact, half of the subsample (49 percent) noted that in the case of women's labor force participation, they were willing to bend their beliefs. This was not only the case among individuals with more moderate beliefs: In fact, there was an even split between those who strongly and somewhat agreed that it was better for women to change their names.

For otherwise gender-conservative respondents, thinking in terms of roles shifted their frame of reference to a practical matter of business or finances. One respondent even modified her own name based on the role she was occupying at the time:

> [Sigh] I consider that to be a matter of business. If you're employed and you have established a profession in your maiden name. I went through this myself. Having an established professional career everyone knew me as my, under my maiden name—and changing it to my husband's name could have led to a lot of confusion and people not knowing who I was. . . . After I left that profession and became a homemaker—you know a stay-at-home mom for awhile—I went ahead and changed my name legally to his name.

This type of response—providing a seemingly more liberal view when the workplace was evoked—was common. As another individual noted, "If she's already established with financial ties to her future, I mean, to her maiden

name, then she should keep it. I mean, if her source of income has been, has something to do with her name." Similarly, one respondent noted that a woman could keep her name "if she is a professional and her name is, you know, used for her business, for her livelihood, and she is continuing in that business or whatever."

Women and work may be one arena in which individuals' views on gender have moved toward egalitarianism, perhaps because of changing economic circumstances—while still leaving individuals' traditional gender views on most other issues intact. This suggests that measures eliciting role-based responses may overestimate liberalness in a population and fail to identify many more conservative respondents.

CONCLUSION

The study of gendered language, once central to the social sciences, has received little attention in recent sociological work. There is, however, a growing awareness of the value of a seemingly trivial aspect of language—heterosexual married women's surnames—for the study of gender. In this article we assessed the potential of name-change measures to tap into Americans' gender attitudes, also examining *why* they performed so well. Such a task is critical for survey research on gender attitudes, which has relied on traditional work–family items based in a separate-spheres approach. This approach has persisted well past the relatively short and far-from-universal era of the male breadwinner–female homemaker in the United States. While gender and work–family scholars have long pushed "beyond separate spheres" and away from role-based understandings of gender, these insights have not yet translated into survey research. Our central goal was thus to develop understandings of effective approaches to gender attitude measurement.

We took a mixed-methods approach, first using two sets of quantitative analyses to test the power of name-change items as indicators of gender attitudes. We demonstrated that sociodemographic patterns for name-change items were consistent with established findings regarding sociodemographic cleavages in gender attitudes. In fact, these patterns were even stronger than those provided by separate-spheres items—some of the most commonly used measures of gender attitudes. We also showed that measures of name-change attitudes consistently outperformed measures of separate-spheres beliefs in linking to a wide array of gender-related social attitudes, even net of these sociodemographic factors. For example, while scholars have expressed concern that feminist self-identification is poorly linked to traditional work–family

measures, the name-change scale was more tightly associated with this—as well as 11 other—indicators of gendered beliefs.

Our final set of qualitative analyses identified three key features that made name-change items so effective. First, we found that the collectivist–individualist tension actually served as a central litmus test with regard to gender beliefs: Collectivist concerns tended to undergird conservative gender beliefs, while liberal beliefs were typically individualist in nature. This division runs through much work on gender, as appeals to the collective interests of family, society, religion, and tradition often come from particularly gender-conservative locations (Klatch 2001; Luker 1984) while individualistic interests are a hallmark of liberal feminism. Indeed, the exceptional ability of name-change attitudes to predict other gender-related social attitudes suggests that this divide is indicative of how individuals organize their views on gender—raising the importance of developing measures attuned to the collectivist–individualist tension.

The centrality of identity to how many respondents understand name change suggests that this concept may reflect a new way of interpreting gender—one that is currently most common among certain groups (i.e., women, African Americans, and the better educated) but likely to diffuse. In fact, identity may be one of the modern battlegrounds on which the tension between collectivism versus individualism plays out, particularly in the case of gender. That identity should be such an ubiquitous way of interpreting gender is not surprising given pervasive discourse of self-identity in modern society. Concerns with identity tend to arise only when the most explicit and overt challenges to equality have been largely overcome. They suggest a move to the symbolic realm, where many individuals perceive gender as primarily a matter of lifestyle choice and representation (England 2010; Giddens 1991). Research on gender attitudes should be sensitive to this ongoing shift by including measures open to identity-based interpretations.

Finally, our analyses emphasize the importance of moving away from items premised on occupancy in specific roles—for example, whether or not a woman can or should be a worker, politician, or scientist—to a more salience-based understanding of gender. Indeed, gender scholars have already turned their attention to understanding what set of cultural rules and instructions for enacting gender individuals see as most central, given complicated and often conflicting sets of roles for men and women. For example, Correll, Benard, and Paik (2007) show that, in the workplace, women's status as a mother often overrides other characteristics, leading to a "motherhood penalty." This way of thinking about gender motivates respondents to consider, if gendered identities (e.g., wife and mother) and their associated

qualities take precedence, even in seemingly gender-equal contexts. Attitudinal questions can more effectively capture this kind of complexity when unlinked from specific roles and role-based contexts.

Marital name change is only one of several ways to elicit beliefs about gender. However, it can be used as an exemplar of the type of measures that may help solve some dilemmas that currently confound survey research on gender attitudes. For example, our analyses suggest that symbolic gender issues may be less likely to encounter false reporting because of social desirability. A second and related challenge is posed by movement away from a more "overt" to a "subtle sexism," which involves endorsement of inequalities that are seen as conventional and therefore go unnoticed (Swim and Cohen 1997). Thus, topics that are perceived as less controversial may be more effective in capturing gender attitudes. Third, the changing nature of discriminatory attitudes also suggests a need to assess gender attitudes with issues that leave room for movement away from conservatism. Finally, name change suggests the promise of using topics for attitudinal research that are contemporaneous and enduring as well as broad reaching (e.g., not tied to a specific set of roles or historical circumstances).

Because gender is both resilient and ever shifting, the study of gender attitudes presents a constant challenge. While past approaches have yielded much insight, a reassessment of how individuals organize their views on gender, and consequently how researchers measure these gender beliefs, is long overdue. Here we use views on marital name change in one—although clearly not the only possible—attempt to reinvigorate this dialogue. Our hope is that our efforts will stimulate further work in this direction and generate additional and creative approaches to gender attitude measurement.

NOTES

1. These means and percentages are based on the 714 cases including full information for the name-change and separate-spheres scales as well as all sociodemographic variables described in Table 2. This sample restriction only minimally alters the values.

2. One may expect an even greater proportion to oppose male name change. Our interview recordings included unsolicited comments that allowed us to check how respondents were interpreting this question. It became apparent that for some otherwise conservative respondents, male name change was such an implausible proposition that they off-handedly or hesitantly agreed it would be okay. For example, as one responded, "Sure, why not [chuckle]. Hey, in America, anything goes. It's a free country." This particular item, therefore, is likely not as powerfully linked to gender

attitudes as the others, and including it provides a conservative test of the abilities of name-change measures.

3. Caution must be exercised when comparing fit statistics across models with different dependent variables. However, in this case, the variance of the name-change scale is greater than that of the separate-spheres scale, suggesting that, if anything, *R*-squared differences may underestimate the extent to which sociodemographic factors explain name-change attitudes in comparison to separate-spheres attitudes.

4. In supplemental analyses we include both scales simultaneously in predicting gender-related attitudes. In all cases the fully standardized coefficient for the name-change scale was larger than for the separate-spheres scale, and in most cases this difference was statistically significant.

5. Supplemental quantitative analyses indicate that the collectivist–individualist divide is itself a significant predictor of all 12 gender-related attitudes. It may be that as attitudinal measures, such as the separate-spheres scale, become less effective at predicting gender attitudes, cross-cutting discourses become available. For example, today women's place in the labor force can be justified by an individualist woman's choice argument or a collectivist argument highlighting the family's economic needs.

REFERENCES

Benard, S., and S. J. Correll. 2010. Normative discrimination and the motherhood penalty. *Gender & Society* 24:616-46.

Bielby, D. D., and W. T. Bielby. 1984. Work commitment, sex-role attitudes, and women's employment. *American Sociological Review* 49:234-47.

Bolzendahl, C., and D. J. Myers. 2004. Feminist attitudes and support for gender equality: Opinion change in women and men, 1974–1998. *Social Forces* 83: 759-90.

Brooks, C., and C. Bolzendahl. 2004. The transformation of U.S. gender role attitudes: Cohort replacement, social-structural change, and ideological learning. *Social Science Research* 33:106-33.

Butler, J. 1990. *Gender trouble: Feminism and the subversion of identity*. New York: Routledge.

Carter, J. S., M. Corra, and S. K. Carter. 2009. The interaction of race and gender: Changing gender-role attitudes, 1974–2006. *Social Science Quarterly* 90: 196-211.

Ciabattari, T. 2001. Changes in men's conservative gender ideologies: Cohort and period influences. *Gender & Society* 15:574-91.

Coontz, S. 1992. *The way we never were: American families and the nostalgia trap*. New York: Basic Books.

Correll, S. J., S. Benard, and I. Paik. 2007. Getting a job: Is there a motherhood penalty? *American Journal of Sociology* 112:1297-1338.

England, P. 2010. The gender revolution: Uneven and unstalled. *Gender & Society* 24:149-66.

Ferree, M. M. 1990. Beyond separate spheres: Feminism and family research. *Journal of Marriage and Family* 52:866-84.

Forbes, G. B., L. E. Adams-Curtis, K. B. While, and N. R. Hamm. 2002. Perceptions of married women and married men with hyphenated surnames. *Sex Roles* 46:167-75.

Foss, K. A., and B. A. Edson. 1989. What's in a name? Accounts of married women's name choices. *Western Journal of Speech and Communication* 53:356-73.

Giddens, A. 1991. *Modernity and self-identity: Self and society in the late modern age*. Cambridge, UK: Polity.

Goldin, C., and M. Shim. 2004. Making a name: Women's names at marriage and beyond. *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 18*:*143-60.

Gooding, G. E., and R. M. Kreider. 2010. Women's naming choices in a nationally representative sample. *Journal of Family Issues* 31:681-701.

Hoffnung, M. 2006. What's in a name? Marital name choice revisited. *Sex Roles* 55:817-25.

Huber, J. 1976. On the generic use of male pronouns. *American Sociologist* 11:89.

Huber, J., and G. Spitze. 1981. Wives' employment, household behaviors, and sex-role attitudes. *Social Forces* 60:150-69.

Johnson, D. R., and L. K. Scheuble. 1995. Women's marital naming in two generations: A national study. *Journal of Marriage and Family* 57:724-32.

Klatch, R. A. 2001. The formation of feminist consciousness among left- and right-wing activists of the 1960s. *Gender & Society* 15:791-815.

Lakoff, R. T. 1975. *Language and woman's place*. New York: Harper & Row.

Lieberson, S., and E. O. Bell. 1992. Children's first names: An empirical study of social taste. *American Journal of Sociology* 98:511-54.

Lieberson, S., S. Dumais, and S. Baumann. 2000. The instability of androgynous names: The symbolic maintenance of gender boundaries. *American Journal of Sociology* 105:1249-87.

Lorber, Judith. 1994. Paradoxes of Gender. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Luker, K. 1984. *Abortion and the politics of motherhood*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Martyna, W. 1980. Beyond the he/man approach: The case for nonsexist language. *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 5:482-93.

Mason, K. O., and Y. Lu. 1988. Attitudes toward women's familial roles: Changes in the United States, 1977–1985. *Gender & Society* 2:39-57.

McCabe, J. 2005. What's in a label? The relationship between feminist self-identification and "feminist" attitudes among U.S. women and men. *Gender & Society* 19:480-505.

McHugh, M. C., and I. H. Frieze. 1997. The measurement of gender-role attitudes: A review and commentary. *Psychology of Women Quarterly* 21:1-16.

Moore, L. M., and R. Vanneman. 2003. Context matters: Effects of the proportion of fundamentalists on gender attitudes. *Social Forces* 82:115-39.

Nugent, C. 2010. Children's surnames, moral dilemmas: Accounting for the predominance of fathers' surnames for children. *Gender & Society* 24:499-525.
Padavic, I., and B. Reskin. 2002. *Women and men at work.* 2nd ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press.
Penfield, J. 1987. Surnaming: The struggle for personal identity. In *Women & language in transition*, edited by J. Penfield. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Powell, B., C. Bolzendahl, C. Geist, and L. C. Steelman. 2010. *Counted out: Same-sex relations and Americans' definitions of family.* New York: Russell Sage.
Plutzer, E. 1988. Work life, family life, and women's support of feminism. *American Sociological Review* 53:640-49.
Raftery, A. 1995. Bayesian model selection in social research. *Sociological Methodology* 25:111-63.
Rice, T. W., and D. L. Coates. 1995. Gender role attitudes in the southern United States. *Gender & Society* 9:744-56.
Ridgeway, C. L., and S. J. Correll. 2004. Unpacking the gender system: A theoretical perspective on gender beliefs and social relations. *Gender & Society* 18:510-31.
Risman, B. J. 2004. Gender as a social structure: Theory wrestling with activism. *Gender & Society* 18:429-50.
Scheuble, L. K., and D. R. Johnson. 1993. Marital name change: Plans and attitudes of college students. *Journal of Marriage and Family* 55:747-54.
Scheuble, L. K., and D. R. Johnson. 2005. Married women's situational use of last names: An empirical study. *Sex Roles* 53:143-51.
Schnittker, J., J. Freese, and B. Powell. 2003. Who are feminists and what do they believe? The role of generations. *American Sociological Review* 68:607-22.
Solis, H., and K. Hall. 2009. Women in the labor force: A databook. Report 1018. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Washington, DC.
Suter, E. A. 2004. Tradition never goes out of style: The role of tradition in women's naming practices. *Communication Review* 7:57-87.
Swim, J. K., and L. L. Cohen. 1997. Overt, covert, and subtle sexism: A comparison between the attitudes toward women and modern sexism scales. *Psychology of Women Quarterly* 21:103-18.
Thorne, B., and N. Henley. 1975. *Language and sex: Difference and dominance.* Rowley, MA: Newbury House.
Thornton, A., and D. Camburn. 1979. Fertility, sex role attitudes, and labor force participation. *Psychology of Women Quarterly* 4:61-80.
U.S. Census Bureau. 2009. Married couple family groups, by labor force status of both spouses. http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hh-fam/cps2009.html.
Weitzman, L. J. 1981. *The marriage contract: Spouses, lovers, and the law*. New York: Free Press.
West, C., and D. H. Zimmerman. 1987. Doing gender. *Gender & Society* 1:125-51.
Whitley, B. E. 2001. Gender-role variables and attitudes toward homosexuality. *Sex Roles* 45:691-721.

Laura Hamilton is an assistant professor at the University of California, Merced. Her mixed-method dissertation asked if parental investments during college translate into expected educational and career gains. Her other work explores the intersection of gender, class, and sexuality among college students (see "Gendered Sexuality in Young Adulthood" in Gender & Society).

Claudia Geist is assistant professor of sociology at the University of Utah. She studies comparative social stratification, family, and gender. Her recent work has examined the gendered link between family status and internal migration, racial differences in young adults' dating rituals, definitions of family, and housework in comparative perspective.

Brian Powell is the James Rudy Professor of Sociology at Indiana University. His recent book (with Catherine Bolzendahl, Claudia Geist, and Lala Carr Steelman), Counted Out: Same-Sex Relations and Americans' Definitions of Family, explores Americans' attitudes toward what does and does not "count" as family.