Uribe A, James F. Spriggs II, Hansford TG.
The Influence of Congressional Preferences on Legislative Overrides of Supreme Court Decisions. Law & Society Review. 2014;48 (4) :921-945.
Publisher's VersionAbstractStudies of Court–Congress relations assume that Congress overrides Court decisions based on legislative preferences, but no empirical evidence supports this claim. Our first goal is to show that Congress is more likely to pass override legislation the further ideologically removed a decision is from pivotal legislative actors. Second, we seek to determine whether Congress rationally anticipates Court rejection of override legislation, avoiding legislation when the current Court is likely to strike it down. Third, most studies argue that Congress only overrides statutory decisions. We contend that Congress has an incentive to override all Court decisions with which it disagrees, regardless of their legal basis. Using data on congressional overrides of Supreme Court decisions between 1946 and 1990, we show that Congress overrides Court decisions with which it ideologically disagrees, is not less likely to override when it anticipates that the Court will reject override legislation, and acts on preferences regardless of the legal basis of a decision. We therefore empirically substantiate a core part of separation‐of‐powers models of Court–Congress relations, as well as speak to the relative power of Congress and the Court on the ultimate content of policy.
Hansford TG, Johnson K.
The Supply of Amicus Curiae Briefs in the Market for Information at the U.S. Supreme Court. Justice System Journal. 2014;35 (4) :362-382.
Publisher's VersionAbstractWe argue that the Supreme Court's expressed and latent demand for information on the availability and implications of legal policy alternatives will affect the supply of information provided to the Court by organized interests. An analysis of the annual growth in amicus filings at the Court during the 1949 through 2008 terms largely supports our specific hypotheses. The rate at which the Court cites amicus briefs and shifts in the Court's ideological location or agenda exert a positive effect on the growth of amicus filings, while the evidence for the effect of dissensus is mixed. We further show that the supply of briefs does not affect the Court's expressed or latent demand for information.
Nicholson SP, Hansford TG.
Partisans in Robes: Party Cues and Public Acceptance of Supreme Court Decisions. American Journal of Political Science. 2014;58 (3) :620-636.
Publisher's VersionAbstractThe public perceives the Supreme Court to be a legal institution. This perception enables the Court's legitimacy‐conferring function, which serves to increase public acceptance of its decisions. Yet, the public acknowledges a political aspect to the Court as well. To evaluate how the public responds to the different images of the Supreme Court, we investigate whether and how depictions of specifically partisan (e.g., Republican) Court rulings shape public acceptance of its decisions while varying institutional, legal, and issue characteristics. Using survey experiments, we find that party cues and partisanship, more so than the imprimatur of the Court, affect public acceptance. We also find that polarization diminishes the effect of party cues. Attributing a decision to the Court does little to increase baseline acceptance or attenuate partisan cue effects. The Court's uniqueness, at least in terms of its legitimacy‐conferring function, is perhaps overstated.
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