We address an important aspect of judicial careers: the elevation of judges from the U.S. District Courts to the Courts of Appeals. We argue that the likelihood of a judge being elevated is a function of informational cues and signals regarding the nature of the judge and the judge’s compatibility with presidential preferences. We also expect norms involving the intersection between geography and Senate politics to affect a judge’s elevation chances. Using data on district court judges appointed between 1946 and 1995, we find that the likelihood of a judge being elevated is a function of the judge’s ideological compatibility with the president, the judge’s previous ABA rating, and Senate norms involving state “ownership” of appeals court seats. Blunt indicators of policy preferences trump direct signals when presidents decide whom to elevate, leaving judges little control over their career prospects and thus less incentive to slant their decisions in the direction of the president’s preferences.

Presidents often move quite slowly to exercise their important power of judicial appointment. This study attempts to explain these delays by developing a strategic conception of the timing of presidential nominations to the lower federal courts. We argue that the judicial selection process may be best conceptualized by viewing presidents as strategic actors who prefer to select judges with policy preferences that are as close as possible to those of the president, given senatorial and temporal constraints. We test our argument by estimating a duration model of the length of time between vacancy and nomination for all vacancies in the U.S. District Courts and U.S. Courts of Appeals from 1977 to 1999. Our results indicate that the timing of presidential nominations is a function of both politics and institutional constraint.

When and why will organized interests choose to lobby the U.S. Supreme Court by submitting amicus curiae briefs? This article argues that organized interests are most likely to lobby the Court when conditions increase their expectation of influencing the Court’s policy outputs. However, when deciding which policy venue to lobby, organized interests that rely on membership support will also have to consider the effect of their lobbying decisions on their ability to attract and retain members. Analysis of the amicus curiae brief filings of 579 organized interests suggests that an interest is more likely to submit amicus briefs at the Supreme Court when the Court is receptive to the positions advocated by the interest and the interest has participated at the Court in the past. The results also indicate that membership-based groups will take into account the extent to which relevant cases have been covered by the media when choosing whether to lobby the Court.

How do organized interests select the Supreme Court cases in which to file amicus curiae briefs? Starting with the assumption that organized interests pursue policy influence, I argue that an organized interest will submit amicus curiae briefs in the cases that provide the greatest opportunity for the interest to influence the content of the majority opinion. Membership-based interests, however, will also have to consider the effect of their case-selection decisions on their ability to attract and retain membership support. I test my hypotheses with data on a large sample of organized interests and their amicus curiae brief filings in the 1991-1995 Supreme Court terms. The results of this analysis provide support for my hypotheses and indicate that organized interests seek out cases in which the justices are relatively information-poor. Membership-based interests also choose cases that allow for visible and apparently “successful” participation.

What explains how and why the Supreme Court interprets precedent? We contend thatjustices incorporate precedents into their opinions to maximize the extent to which the Court’s legal policy reflects their own policy preferences and to increase the likelihood that their opinions will be efficacious. Thus, we expect the interpretation of precedent to be influenced by the justices’ policy preferences, the norm of stare decisis, and certain characteristics of precedents. To test this idea, we examined how, in all cases decided in the 1991 and 1995 terms, the Court’s majority opinions chose to legally interpret the set of available Supreme Court precedents. While our results are not uniformly supportive of our hypotheses, they lend general support to our theoretical argument. First, we demonstrate that the Court is more likely to positively interpret (rather than not interpret) a precedent that is ideologically proximate to theCourt, that is legally relevant, or that was previously positively interpreted by the Court. When considering negative treatment broadly construed, our data only demonstrate that the legal relevance of a precedent exerts any influence. However, when we restrict our analysis to “strong” negative interpretation of precedent, we uncover reasonable support for the influence of stare decisis in that both the legal relevance of precedent and prior negative interpretation of precedent affect strong negative treatment. Thus, one implication of this study is that, contrary to the attitudinal model’s prediction, the Court’s prior treatment of precedent does appear to influence the way justices make decisions.

The decision to overrule U.S. Supreme Court precedent, we argue, results from the justices’ pursuit of their policy preferences within intra- and extra-Court constraints. Based on a duration analysis of cases decided from the 1946 through 1995 terms, we show that ideological incongruence between a precedent and a subsequent Court increases the chance of it being overruled. Two legal norms also exert substantive effects as the Court is less likely to overrule statutory precedents and more likely to overrule precedents that previously have been interpreted negatively by the Court. While certain precedent characteristics also influence this decision, the political environment exerts no such effect. Consequently, one of the principal implications of this research is that legal norms influence Supreme Court decision making.

With few exceptions, scholars have generally relied on judges’ final votes on the menrts as the primary indicator of judicial outcomes. Yet, to fully understand judicial decision-making we think it imperative that research also focus on the interpretation of precedent and legal change. To do so, it is necessary to develop measures of legal change and the treatment of precedent over time. Scholars have begun doing so by using Shepard’s Citations, a legal citation index. One of the most important fetures of Shepard’s is its list of all opinions that legally treat a previously decided case, as well as its characterization of the nature of that legal treatment. Yet, the reliability and validity of Shepard’s is unknown, and we should therefore be appropriately skeptical of it. This article empirically tests the reliability of Shepard’s and discusses the validity of its coding protocols. Our analysis demonstrates that Shepard’s coding of legal treament is quite reliable, though there is some notable variance across Sheard’s treatment categories. We also point out several features of Shepard’s that could potentially affect the validity of a measure derived from it. We conclude that, as long as scholars keep these validity issues in mind, Shepard’s can be a highly appropriate data source.

Previous research examining the impact of extra-Court factors on Supreme Court decision making has developed conflicting theoretical perspectives supported with limited empirical evidence. In an attempt to better assess the influence of Congress on Court decisions, we develop a theoretical model specifying the conditions under which congressional preferences might constrain justices’ votes on the merits. More specifically, we argue that previous congressional overrides in an issue area and case-level interest group activity make congressional preferences salient for the justices. In these threat situations, the justices will be most likely to shift their final votes on the merits in a manner congruent with the preferences of Congress. Based on our logit analysis of data on all orally argued statutory cases from 1963 to 1995, we find mixed support for our hypotheses and conclude that there are limited conditions under which congressional preferences may influence a justice’s vote.

Despite the well-documented decline of political parties in the electorate, the evidence shows that parties remain highly salient and visible within government, particularly in Congress, and the formal party organizations continue to play an active role in campaigns. Building on this evidence, we attempt to offer further insight into the goals and activities of contemporary American political parties by investigating the allocation of partycontrolled resources in congressional elections. In particular, we examine the resource allocation strategies employed by the Democratic and Republican partie’s congressional (the DCCC and the NRCC) and national (DNC and RNC) campaign committees to assess if these resources are used to enhance party support within Congress or are motivated strictly by electoral concerns. Via tobit analysis, we test our specification using data for challengers and incumbents of both parties from 1989-96. Our results suggest that these resources, particularly for the Republican party, are prompted by campaign-specific factors and are not used to facilitate party support within Congress.